N613SMIC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----x 2 3 CAROLE SMITH, 4 Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. 5 22 Civ. 4389 (DLC) V. 6 GLAAD, INC., 7 Defendant. ----x 8 Teleconference 9 June 1, 2023 3:00 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. DENISE COTE, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 16 MENKEN SIMPSON & ROZGER, LLP 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: BRUCE E. MENKEN 18 19 SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON Attorneys for Defendant 20 BY: BRIAN D. MURPHY 21 22 23 24 25

N613SMIC (The court and parties appearing telephonically) 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Cote. 2 3 Smith v. GLAAD, 22 Civ. 4389. 4 Is plaintiff's counsel ready to proceed? 5 MR. MENKEN: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor. 6 Bruce Menken, Menken Simpson & Rozger. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Is counsel for the defendant ready to proceed? 8 9 MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor. Good afternoon. This 10 is Brian Murphy from Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. I have two letters. 12 one was from defense counsel dated today, and it raises an 13 issue about whether a deposition of an additional person needs 14 to be taken. That's the deposition of Ms. Marra. As I 15 understand it, the plaintiff seeks to take Ms. Marra's 16 deposition. 17 Then I received just a few minutes ago a letter from plaintiff's counsel with respect to a request for certain 18 telephone records. We'll deal with that in a moment. Let's 19 20 just deal with the deposition issue first. 21 I have defendant's opposition to the plaintiff's

I have defendant's opposition to the plaintiff's request to take Ms. Marra's deposition. So Mr. Menken, I want to give you an opportunity to be heard.

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MR. MENKEN: Sure. Your Honor, first let me say that the proposal to depose Ms. Marra was made several months ago.

I spoke to Mr. Murphy about it, and there was initially not an objection. Then there was an objection after I noticed the deposition.

And I might add that as a sort of a compromise courtesy, I let Mr. Murphy know that the deposition would be remote, rather than in person, which is the way the other three depositions were conducted. And also we would limit it to 90 minutes. And I told him that plaintiff would not be present during that remote deposition.

And then there is a reference in Mr. Murphy's letter that my client was agitated and or some description that there might be some problem if Ms. Marra were deposed and my client were present. My client's not really angry. She's just really committed and upset. And to alleviate the potential concern, she's not going to be present during the other 90-minute remote deposition that we're seeking.

Significantly, there are three or four issues that I'd like to question Ms. Marra about, that again, I think I could obtain that information in short order. One is a really important question, which is whether she was asked if she considers herself queer. This was a question that the chief strategy officer Grant Schneider asked my client not once, but twice, during her fourth job interview.

Taking a step back, your Honor, the reason why the questions asked by the employer are important in a case like

this, which is a failure to hire case, is that, as you know, plaintiff's got to show intent to discriminate, and courts have obviously held that showing intent can be a challenge at some times, and it could be slippery at times in discovery cases.

So therefore, the questions that an employer asks a witness clearly reflects the intent of the employer and what criteria it deems important when deciding who to hire and who not to hire.

So when the chief strategy officer of -- the employer's chief strategy officer asks an applicant for a job, who has three prior interviews, if she considers herself queer, twice, that's quite telling. If he doesn't ask a person who is 20 to 25 years younger, that's also quite telling.

We need to be able to ask Ms. Marra what she remembered about her interview by Mr. Schneider, and whether he asked her that question.

So that's the first -- that's the most important part of the proffer in the deposition of Ms. Marra.

There is also testimony that Ms. Pointer, the decision maker for GLAAD, considered Ms. Marra's international experience as a factor in deciding to hire Ms. Marra and not Ms. Smith. Beside the fact it's not in the job listing, and it is not in the job description, we still want to ask Ms. Marra whether she had international experience or international research experience.

Lastly, there is a certain specific period of time,
November 30, when my client was interviewed by the chief
strategy officer and asked that unlawful question twice, and
December 3 when I believe there was an oral communication
between the employer and Ms. Marra where there was a new offer
conveyed to Ms. Marra, and she then verbally accepted the job.

It's important to note that the day before my client was interviewed on November 30 by the chief strategy officer, Ms. Marra rejected GLAAD's job offer. So, as of November 30, there was no job offer on the table when Mr. Schneider, the chief strategy officer, asked my client that illegal question not once, but twice.

So, again, we believe that this deposition not only is in good faith, and seeks to elicit critical information that we're entitled to.

THE COURT: Before I turn to Mr. Murphy, Mr. Menken, do you have Ms. Marra's résumé or application?

MR. MENKEN: We have her résumé.

THE COURT: And it does not list international experience?

MR. MENKEN: Correct, it does not.

THE COURT: So you have no basis from the documents to understand that Ms. Marra had any international experience?

MR. MENKEN: That's correct. However, there was a presentation during the interview process that Ms. Marra gave

to Mr. Schneider, the chief strategy officer, and Ms. Pointer, the decision maker, and according to Ms. Pointer's testimony, Ms. Marra said that she had international experience, and that was a factor that Ms. Pointer and GLAAD took into consideration when making a decision to offer and hire Ms. Marra.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Murphy.

MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Judge. So I'll take those in order.

First, Mr. Menken would like to explore whether

Ms. Marra was asked if she was queer during her interview with

Grant Schneider. Mr. Schneider has already testified -- two

things. Mr. Schneider has acknowledged having asked the

question during plaintiff's interview, and it is slightly

outside the scope of what we discussed, but he had a lot of

explanation for it and how it was contextual, given that GLAAD

is an LGBTQ organization advancing LGBTQ interests.

Two, he already acknowledged that he did not ask that question of any other applicants, because it was not in the context of the conversation with any other applicant, including Tristan Marra.

So, it is undisputed as it stands that she was not asked that question. And if Mr. Menken's goal is to explore or to establish, I guess, differential treatment as between the two, well, it is established, based upon the current record, at

least vis-a-vis the asking of that question. So I don't see how that is relevant. I do think if that is ultimately important to Mr. Menken, that could be answered through much less intrusive or burdensome means, such as an interrogatory. But that remains to be seen.

Two, on the issue of experience, and I don't have the full transcript in front of me right now, but a few points I'd like to raise. One, as set forth in our letter, all three witnesses that have already been deposed have spoken glowingly about plaintiff's experience. She had certainly chronologically or orally much more experience just in the work force and in media and as well as involvement with LGBTQ issues, because she's been in the work force longer. The testimony is uniform that she was an exceptionally qualified candidate.

Two, Ms. Pointer in particular and I can't recall -THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Murphy, one second. You
referred to the plaintiff having a lot more experience. Did
you mean to refer to the plaintiff or Ms. Marra?

MR. MURPHY: No, I meant to refer to the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MURPHY: Yes. It is a long way of saying there is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff was qualified for the position. The ultimate issue, and there is extensive testimony on this from Ms. Pointer, the decision maker, is to

how she evaluated the different types of experience they had. One component of which was Ms. Marra's employment with one of her prior employers. She had done some research concerning international global trends. Again, I'm not aware off the top of my head of the specific issue, but pertaining to global trends pertaining to the LGBTQ movement. So, there is extensive testimony, and I think that's really the relevant issue that Tristan Marra can provide no testimony about, which is how did GLAAD evaluate the qualifications. What did GLAAD consider important. Not whether she had it or not. And Tristan can provide -- Ms. Marra can provide absolutely no testimony on that, because it is undisputed she was not party to the process by which her candidacy or plaintiff's candidacy was evaluated.

The third proposed area of questioning is around I guess the timeline of an offer and an acceptance, and I think Mr. Menken is being very precise, but I think it creates a misleading view of the world.

So, what had occurred from a timing perspective is that plaintiff was interviewed after GLAAD had narrowed down a list of candidates to some proposed finalists. The plaintiff underwent two interviews before the third allegedly problematic interview on November 30. GLAAD extended, I think it was eight days before this interview, November 22, extended a verbal offer of employment to Ms. Marra. That offer was not accepted

until approximately December 3. What happened in the interim was not a rejection of the offer or a withdrawal of the offer. What happened was a salary negotiation. While Mr. Menken is correct that the original terms of the proposed offer were rejected, they were rejected along with the message, hey, I'm interested in this position, I need a couple more dollars before I accept. So, that is what transpired there.

I see again, since there is no dispute that the offer, you know, GLAAD came to the decision, and that's what this case is about, was the decision problematic. GLAAD came to the decision to extend an offer to the successful candidate seven or eight days before the interview occurred where the allegedly problematic statements were made. That's all that's relevant. Whether there was salary negotiation or whether the deal was not consummated until three or two days after this allegedly problematic interview is irrelevant.

And I don't believe, in fact, there is no testimony that Ms. Marra can provide that would be anything other than cumulative at best, since this all exists in e-mail form. We have e-mail confirmations of when the offer was made, we have e-mail confirmations of the salary negotiation, and we have e-mail confirmations of the acceptance of the offer.

So I think it is problematic or unnecessary to depose Ms. Marra for at best cumulative information.

So, your Honor, that's my response to the points

raised by Mr. Menken. I'm happy to address some of the other concerns we have, but I don't want to go too far afield.

THE COURT: So I think let's stay focused on whether or not the plaintiff can take Ms. Marra's deposition.

And Mr. Menken, it seems to me the only potentially relevant issue here is whether or not Ms. Marra had international experience, and I'll let you put an interrogatory to her with respect to whether or not she discussed any international experience during the interview process, such that you would be able to know whether or not the decision makers were being frank with you when they said they took that into account. But I don't think there is a need for another deposition.

MR. MENKEN: Your Honor, I want to add one thing, your Honor, which is that Mr. Murphy just said in argument, okay, that Mr. Schneider said he did not ask Ms. Marra the queer question. That's not what his testimony was. His testimony was he did not remember. He did not know. So, if in fact the Court is prohibiting me from deposing Ms. Marra, at a minimum, maybe the defendant wants to stipulate in a document, in an affidavit that GLAAD or any of its representatives did not ask Tristan Marra whether she considered herself queer.

THE COURT: So, let me ask you one question,
Mr. Murphy. Are you planning to call Ms. Marra as a trial
witness?

MR. MURPHY: No, your Honor. Not at the present time.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to let the plaintiff

depose Ms. Marra, should the defendant decide to call Ms. Marra

as a trial witness.

So, we have a court reporter here, so if things change, and in the pretrial order the defendant identifies

Ms. Marra as a trial witness, I am going to give the plaintiff an opportunity to take her deposition at that time.

Let's turn to this other issue about the subpoena for phone records. Mr. Murphy, have you had a chance to look at Mr. Menken's letter of today about the six-day period for phone records for two individuals?

MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor, and I told Mr. Menken in advance that I wouldn't object to it being brought up on this conference, because he and I have discussed the issue recently.

THE COURT: Did you wish to be heard, Mr. Murphy, on that?

MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor. Briefly.

So again, there is the timeline I referenced before I think is relevant. Just by way of reminder, plaintiff alleges that the problematic question was asked in an interview with Grant Schneider on November 30, and the ultimate allegation is her response to that question informed GLAAD's decision somehow in not hiring her.

However, and I don't have every transcript up in front

of me, and, Bruce, if I'm incorrect, I apologize. Please correct me. But I do believe all three witnesses have already testified that none of them communicated with Grant Schneider by phone, text message, or otherwise, following that

November 30 meeting, other than one witness saying, I believe

Ms. Pointer saying, she asked him how did it go, and he said the plaintiff is a great candidate. Something very perfunctory.

They've all been consistent in their sworn testimony.

They did not have any text, any e-mail correspondence about the substance of this allegedly problematic interview.

And from where we stand, that's a big problem for plaintiff's case, because if this interview did not play any role in the decision-making process, if no one was aware of it, then of course it could not have influenced the decision.

Frankly, from GLAAD's view, we already know or believe that it could not have influenced GLAAD's decision-making process, because it extended an offer to Marra eight days before this allegedly problematic interview. So, we can put that aside though, and put aside that the testimony is uniform.

There have also been RFPs, requests for production, in this case asking for all communications -- text, e-mail, otherwise -- related to the allegations in the complaint, related to plaintiff, related to the interview with Grant Schneider. And we have searched. I haven't physically picked

up anyone's phones, but I have been working with my client for months at this point, I've represented them for years on a pro bono basis, and I have every confidence they took my direction and searched their phones for records, text messages that would have been responsive to requests for production that are ultimately the same as these interrogatories, for the most part.

We've represented now in this case through written discovery responses that we don't have those. They are not in our possession, meaning, as far as we know, they don't exist. Certainly I don't have them. And the client's represented they don't.

So now, for the interrogatories, plaintiff wants provider information I think because he simply doesn't believe us. And Mr. Menken and I get along just fine in this case, we're very courteous with each other. But ultimately, that can be the only explanation for these interrogatories is he doesn't believe what the witnesses have testified to under oath and the representations I've made as an attorney admitted before this court in responding to other discovery requests.

So, I think it's belaboring the point. It is a bit intrusive to seek the personal phone records through the providers, whatever the mechanism ultimately he intends to proceed by, to challenge something that at this point is undisputed both by the witnesses and by me as their

representative that those records don't exist.

THE COURT: So Mr. Menken, did you want to be heard?

MR. MENKEN: Please. Your Honor, first with regard to the first issue and the deposition. For summary judgment purposes, I think I need a stipulation to sit for the defendants to sign that Ms. Marra was not asked the queer question. And I'm hoping the Court will so order that.

THE COURT: No, I'm not going to require the parties to stipulate. If there is a summary judgment motion, you can make your argument. Thank you. But, we've moved past that.

I'm sorry?

MR. MENKEN: With regards to the interrogatories, I'd like to respond, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MENKEN: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Murphy and I have been around long enough to know that just because a witness testifies to something and says something, does not necessarily mean it's accurate, does not necessarily mean that that witness's memory is on point.

So, with regard to the interrogatories, they are not asked to harass, and they are completely relevant and critical to the case. Mr. Schneider was personally asked by Ms. Pointer to interview my client. Mr. Schneider was intimately involved in interviewing the other candidate, Ms. Marra. Okay. And on November 30, he asked my client a question that's prohibited

under documents produced by GLAAD when it describes what is proper questions, what are proper questions for an interview. So, he admits asking that question on November 30, and from November 30 to December 3, we're supposed to believe that he and Ms. Pointer had no communication at all.

And the reason why it's obvious that he had had some communication is because on Monday, December 6, at 9:30 in the morning, the first workday after there was a verbal offer and acceptance to Ms. Marra, Ms. Pointer sends a private personal e-mail to Mr. Schneider saying, great news, Tristan accepted the job as head of research. Woo-hoo, thanks for the support, guidance, and constant encouragement. Grateful. More to come.

It really is strong evidence to show that between

November 30 and December 3, Mr. Schneider communicated with

Ms. Pointer and provided her his feelings and opinion on my

client, Carole Smith's candidacy for the job. And considering

he is the chief strategy officer, he's a part of the executive

team, he was specifically asked by Ms. Pointer to interview my

client, I can't believe that Ms. Pointer would not want to know

what Mr. Schneider felt about my client, and what his opinion

was of her candidacy. It just doesn't make any sense, it's

preposterous, and of course they are going to testify that he

didn't call her. And I don't want to suggest that someone is

lying, but it might very well be that. Maybe he forgot.

THE COURT: So --

MR. MENKEN: So it tests that testimony. I have a carefully crafted and tailored interrogatory, and all I am going to get -- I'm not going to get the narrative of the call or the narrative of the text. It is just going to be an indication of whether there was a call between the two parties, or calls, and whether there were texts between the parties.

THE COURT: So Mr. Menken, I think you put your finger on the problem, that these are all people who work in the same business together and rely on each other. The phone records that you seek aren't going to reveal what the substance of any conversation was, even if they had contact with each other. The message you described of December 6 does not indicate that there was any communication in the preceding days or any particular period of time.

Counsel are able to argue inferences to the jury, if it gets to that point. But any substantive communications, to the extent that a record exists, you'll receive that in discovery. I am not going to require the parties to turn over their personal identifying information to the plaintiff or allow you to get their phone records for that, even though it is a limited period of time.

Counsel, I know you've worked hard with respect to discovery so far. I'm glad you're towards the very end of this process. You have a schedule for any summary judgment motion.

Let me ask you, Mr. Murphy, do you expect to bring

1 | such a motion?

MR. MURPHY: I believe so, your Honor, as it stands right now.

THE COURT: Okay. If you decide not to, that's just fine. I don't expect the plaintiff to bring a summary judgment motion. In these cases usually it is the defendant, but let's set a schedule.

If there is going to be no summary judgment motion, please let me know by July 21, and then we'll get out a further order with respect to a pretrial order schedule, so we can get this case tried efficiently and quickly for you.

Thank you all, counsel. I hope you have a very good summer. Good luck.

MR. MENKEN: Thank you.

MR. MURPHY: Thank you.

(Adjourned)